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TARGETING COBELLIGERENTS
Jens David Ohlin
I. Introduction
Th e current debate about targeted killings has revolved around the central divide 
between jus ad bellum and jus in bello. Either the launching of a drone strike is 
considered a defensive use of force to be evaluated under the traditional rules of 
self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, or the drone strike is to be evalu-
ated under the rules of warfare codiﬁ ed in international humanitarian law.1 Th e 
prohibition against the killing of civilians is of particular concern here. Of course, 
the two issues are not mutually exclusive. One can coherently claim that drone 
strikes satisfy the demands of jus ad bellum but fail to live up to the requirements 
of jus in bello, and are therefore illegal.2 Th e reverse is possible as well. One might 
conclude that targeted killings do not run afoul of international humanitarian law 
(IHL) but violate the core ad bellum prohibition against the unlawful use of force 
codiﬁ ed in the UN Charter. Th ese are all logical permutations of the argument.
At a conceptual level, international law is deeply conﬂ icted about how to handle 
targeted killings; the issue falls between the state-based system of public interna-
tional law and the individualized system of domestic criminal law. Th e former 
contemplates armed conﬂ icts between combatants who open themselves up to the 
reciprocal risk of killing; the latter contemplates killings in self-defense only when 
1 See, e.g., Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of 
Pakistan, 2004–2009” in Simon Bronitt ed., Shooting to Kill: Th e Law Governing Lethal Force in 
Context (Hart Publishing, forthcoming) (concluding that targeted killings violate both spheres 
of the law of war); Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary 
Executions, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Execution: Study 
on Targeted Killings, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 
28, 2010).
2 Cf. Jordan J. Paust, “Self-Defense Targetings of Non-State Actors and Permissibility of U.S. 
Use of Drones in Pakistan,” 19 J. Transnational Law and Policy (2010) 237 (concluding that drone 
strikes are a valid exercise of self-defense).
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the traditional progression of arrest, trial, and punishment is unavailable. Because 
the terrorist is a non-state actor who falls between these two categories, the cur-
rent law has had diﬃ  culty not only providing a positive rule regarding the legality 
of targeted killings, but also deﬁ nitively choosing the correct paradigm. Even the 
application of traditional rules of IHL to the activity remains contested, since such 
an application presupposes that one paradigm has been selected over the other.3 
It may even be the case that no positive rule of customary international law has 
crystallized to govern the practice.4
Assuming, arguendo, that some form of targeted killing is permissible in some situ-
ations, a central and deeply contested question remains: who can be targeted and 
why? Th e selection of paradigms again structures our natural intuitions about the 
answer. Th ose concerned with national security are inclined to view the question 
through the lens of the laws of war, where all bona ﬁ de combatants are assumed to 
be targetable with lethal force. Th ose concerned with civil liberties are inclined to 
view the question through the lens of the criminal law (or domestic law more gen-
erally), where a judge or jury determines outcomes based on a rigorous fact-ﬁ nding 
process, and where capture and punishment—not killing—is the default norm. 
Th e question of targeting straddles the tension between national security and civil 
liberties and it is unclear how it can (or should) be resolved.
Th is chapter investigates the tension between national security and civil liberties 
through a distinctive conceptual framework: What linking principle can be used to 
connect the targeted individual with the collective group that represents the secu-
rity threat? Section II will explain and defend this methodology by demonstrating 
that no account of targeted killing—whether sounding in jus in bello or jus ad 
bellum—can be complete without making explicit reference to a linking principle. 
Section III will then proceed to catalog ﬁ ve major linking principles—taken from 
diﬀ erent domains of law including the use of force, international humanitarian 
law, and criminal law—that could potentially serve that function: direct partici-
pation, co-belligerency, membership, control, and complicity/conspiracy. Section 
IV will then conclude with a comparative evaluation of the linking principles that 
exposes their strengths and weaknesses.
Th e resulting conclusion will be counter-intuitive to readers accustomed to the 
standard positions in the literature. Although one would think that criminal law 
principles, with their strict adherence to conduct rules and culpability, would 
result in the greatest maximization of civil liberties, this intuition is not realized 
once the criminal law principles are divorced from their traditional legal process: 
3 See Gabriella Blum and Philip Heymann, “Law and Policy of Targeted Killing,” 1 Harvard 
National Security Journal (2010) 145 (comparing two paradigms: war and exceptional peacetime 
operations).
4 See S.S. Lotus (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18.
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the courtroom. Th e question of who can be targeted (and the individual’s rela-
tionship to the collective) requires a more nuanced response, one that uses the 
legal concepts developed for the law of war, but properly reformulated to take into 
account the realities of asymmetrical warfare with non-state terrorist organiza-
tions. Th e legal concepts developed for use in criminal trials provide false comfort 
that one is respecting civil liberties, but ironically they oﬀ er fewer protections. In 
the end, reformulated and redeﬁ ned law of war principles, with their reliance on 
status concepts and proxies such as membership, do the job better because the 
concepts are comparatively more public, transparent, and self-administering than 
their competitors in the criminal law.
II. Th e problem of linking
Regardless of which paradigm is selected, there is inevitably a deep conceptual 
puzzle that straddles both sides of the fundamental divide between jus ad bel-
lum and jus in bello. In both cases, it is unlikely that the single individual who is 
targeted—in isolation—satisﬁ es the demands of either argument. Th e individual 
must be linked to a larger collective—a larger belligerent force—that explains the 
relevancy of the single individual. Th is linking requirement is a function of both 
the jus ad bellum and jus in bello analyses, for example, one cannot simply avoid 
the linking issue by switching from jus ad bellum to jus in bello or vice versa.
Within the context of jus ad bellum, the traditional argument for a drone attack 
relies on the international doctrine of self-defense, recognized in Article 51 of the 
UN Charter but also certainly recognized in customary law as well as the just 
war tradition.5 Th e United States has argued publicly that their drone attacks in 
Yemen, Pakistan, and Afghanistan are supported by the doctrine of self-defense.6 
However, under any version of the principle of self-defense—whether expounded 
by public international lawyers or legal philosophers—the target of the defen-
sive counter-attack must constitute a threat to the United States or its allies.7 Th e 
underlying threat makes the defensive force “necessary”—a universally recog-
nized constraint on the use of force in self-defense under either basic principles 
5 Compare Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, (Advisory Opinion on the Wall) 2004 I.C.J. 136, 189, 194 (July 9, 
2004) (no international right of self-defense against non-state actors), with Armed Activities on 
the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 2005 I.C.J. 168, 222–6 (December 19). 
See also Mary Ellen O’Connell, “Th e Legal Case Against the Global War on Terror,” 36 Case West 
Reserve Journal of International Law (2004) 349.
6 See Harold H. Koh, U.S. Department of State, Th e Obama Administration and International 
Law, Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC (March 25, 
2010), available at <http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm> accessed November 4, 
2011.
7 See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7th edn. (Oxford University Press, 
2008) 732–3.
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of criminal law or international law.8 Th e notion that self-defense is a necessary 
response to a threat is part of the universal structure of self-defense arguments in 
any legal or moral context.9
My point here is not to advocate for any particular version of what constitutes a 
“threat”—nor what makes a defensive response to it “necessary.” Th ese are sticky 
theoretical questions that form the center of most debates about self-defense. 
Rather, the issue I want to explore is one level deeper. Regardless of one’s assess-
ment of what constitutes a threat to a state’s interests—territorial integrity, politi-
cal independence, etc—it is unlikely that a single individual, by himself or herself, 
can constitute a threat against a state. It is theoretically possible to imagine a hypo-
thetical terrorist who works alone, secretly plotting a devastating attack against a 
state by procuring weapons and then deploying them without any assistance what-
soever. Th e Unabomber is one such example, and it is the exception that proves the 
rule.10
Th e more common situation involves the existence of a terrorist organization or 
militia that constitutes a threat by plotting and implementing terrorist or mil-
itary attacks against a particular state. In such cases, the collective constitutes 
the threat against the national interest, thus generating the right of self-defense. 
Furthermore, the individual stands in a certain relationship with the collective, 
either by belonging to the terrorist organization, contributing to the collective 
endeavor, or some other mode of participation in the collective group.11 For the 
moment we must postpone consideration of which linking principle is most 
appropriate. Th e point here is simply that individuals acting alone almost never 
constitute a national threat. Within the War on Terror and the asymmetrical use 
of targeted killings against non-state actors, an even stronger conclusion is war-
ranted: single individuals never constitute a threat to the United States. Th e threat 
comes from organized groups with political or ideological objectives that they 
seek to bring about by launching attacks against civilians. Th is is the raison d’être 
of global terrorism and jihadism.
Shifting the focus to jus in bello does not relieve us of the obligation to ﬁ nd an 
appropriate linking principle. If terrorists are simply enemy civilians, without any 
8 Ibid. at 734 (citing Caroline case).
9 On the structural similarity of the necessity prong in both national and individual self-defense, 
see G.P Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force is Justiﬁ ed and Why (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 91–6.
10 Indeed, for some theorists, the isolated and individualistic nature of the Unabomber’s criminal 
activities precludes applying to him the label of terrorist, a term usually reserved for organizational 
eﬀ orts. See, e.g., George P. Fletcher, “Th e Indeﬁ nable Concept of Terrorism,” 4 J. International 
Criminal Justice (2006) 894, 907–08 (organization as one element of the family-resemblance con-
cept of terrorism).
11 For a discussion of participation in collective endeavors, see generally Christopher Kutz, 
Complicity: Ethics and Law for a Collective Age (Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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relationship to a larger collective, then no operative principle of IHL permits their 
summary killing.12 It is only when their relationship to a larger collective is consid-
ered that the use of force against them may be permissible. Under traditional rules 
of IHL, combatants may be killed to the extent that they belong to an armed ﬁ ght-
ing force that is engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the United States.13 Indeed, it is 
the collective’s engaging of the armed conﬂ ict with the United States that triggers 
the operation of the IHL norm allowing combatants to be killed. But it is an open 
question whether IHL recognizes the existence of an armed conﬂ ict with a non-
state actor, and whether this is best described as an international armed conﬂ ict 
triggering the Geneva Conventions, a non-international armed conﬂ ict trigger-
ing Common Article 3 of the same, or neither, thus generating conﬂ ict regarding 
the appropriate default rule in the absence of any governing Geneva Convention 
regime.14
In this context, there are multiple problems associated with linking an individual 
to the larger terrorist organization that is engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the 
United States. First, the United States is currently engaged in an armed conﬂ ict 
(international or non-international) with Al Qaeda, but the individuals targeted 
by US drones may or may not be card-carrying members of Al Qaeda.15 Indeed, 
although Al Qaeda may once have been a deﬁ ned and tightly-knit organization 
controlled by Osama bin Laden, the organization has morphed into an amor-
phous network of terrorist organizations operating under the common banner of 
Al Qaeda.16 In rare instances, various local terrorist organizations operating under 
the name Al Qaeda may share operational or ﬁ nancial support from their par-
ent organization, and may even respond to hierarchical commands issued by bin 
Laden himself or his commanders.
In most cases, however, terrorist organizations operating under the banner of Al 
Qaeda in some form are part of a much looser confederacy of co-sympathetic 
12 See Dieter Fleck, Th e Handbook of International Humanitarian Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford 
University Press, 2008) 46 (“Th e outbreak of an armed conﬂ ict between two states will lead to 
many of the rules of ordinary law of peace being superseded, as between the parties to the conﬂ ict, 
by the rules of humanitarian law.”)
13 Ibid. at 82. See also Richard Murphy and Afsheen John Radsan, “Due Process and Targeted 
Killing of Terrorists,” 32 Cardozo Law Review (2009) 405, 416.
14 See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 630 (2006) (conﬂ ict with Al Qaeda is a non-in-
ternational armed conﬂ ict falling under Common Article 3). For a discussion, see D. Glazier, “Full 
and Fair by What Measure?: Identifying the International Law Regulating Military Commission 
Procedure,” 24 Boston University International Law Journal (2006) 55, 60 (“Recognizing that the 
terrorism conﬂ ict does not ﬁ t particularly well with traditional classiﬁ cations of either ‘interna-
tional’ or ‘non-international’ armed conﬂ ict, it concludes that this war is instead best deﬁ ned as 
‘transnational’.”)
15 See O’Connell, “Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of Pakistan, 2004–
2009”, supra n.1,10–11.
16 See Manooher Moﬁ di and Amy E. Eckert, ‘ “Unlawful Combatants” or “Prisoners of War”: 
Th e Law and Politics of Labels,’ 36 Cornell International Law Journal (2003) 59, 82.
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jihadists who share common inspiration and rhetoric without sharing a common 
command structure or operational command.17 Th ey are distinct terrorist organi-
zations linked together by a common cause. It is therefore unclear if the existence 
of an armed conﬂ ict with one Al Qaeda organization can translate into an armed 
conﬂ ict with another sympathetic Al Qaeda organization.18 In some instances, 
both organizations may be suﬃ  ciently well developed that each, on its own terms, 
meets the appropriate standard for being engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the 
United States. In other contexts, however, the over-arching umbrella between the 
organizations may be crucial for our legal determination of an armed conﬂ ict with 
the United States. Th is is particularly true in cases where one terrorist organization 
is well developed and clearly engaged in an armed conﬂ ict, but the second organi-
zation is a nascent and burgeoning endeavor that has not yet launched signiﬁ cant 
attacks.
III. Five possible linking principles
Th e preceding analysis suggests that both the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello 
analyses suﬀ er from a deeper confusion about how to relate the individual terrorist 
with the larger collective. Attacking the problem in this manner will help expose 
the deeper question of how to integrate the non-state actor—and the individual 
terrorist—into the inherently collective nature of public international law and the 
laws of war that arise from it. We should therefore consider all of the possible link-
ing principles and consider which best describes the particular role and function 
of the individual terrorist. Th e possible linking principles include: direct participa-
tion in an armed conﬂ ict, military membership, co-belligerency, control, complic-
ity, and conspiracy.19 A comparative evaluation of the linking principles will cut 
across the jus ad bellum-jus in bello divide.
(a) Direct participation in an armed conﬂ ict
Under a standard jus in bello analysis, civilians are generally protected from the 
reciprocal risk of killing that governs the relations of enemy soldiers.20 Obviously, 
though, this protection can be opportunistically exploited by civilians who use 
their protected status to pursue attacks without subjecting themselves to reciprocal 
risk.21 Such a system of perﬁ dy would create a perverse incentive: soldiers would 
have no incentive to identify themselves as soldiers—the only consequence of their 
identiﬁ cation would be one of exposure. Consequently, traditional rules of jus in 
17 See, e.g., United States v. Mustafa, 406 Fed. Appx. 526 (2nd Cir. 2011).
18 For a discussion, see Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization 
and the War on Terrorism,” 118 Harvard Law Review (2005) 2047, 2112.
19 Th e list of linking principles is not meant to be exhaustive, but rather to include a representa-
tive cross-section of the relevant types.
20 See Fleck, Th e Handbook, supra n. 12, 96–7, 237–8.
21 Ibid. at 80.
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bello deny protected status to civilians who directly participate in the armed con-
ﬂ ict.22 Th e functional justiﬁ cation for this rule is obvious: civilians who engage in 
combatancy are functionally equivalent to traditional combatants and ought to be 
treated similarly, that is, ought to be subject to attack. Th is rule is now codiﬁ ed in 
Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol 1, which states that “civilians shall enjoy the 
protection aﬀ orded by this section, unless and for such time as they take a direct 
part in hostilities.”23
Th e concept of “direct participation” links the individual to the collective ﬁ ght-
ing force that is engaged in hostilities. Th e protection is not lost simply by 
virtue of holding a gun.24 If the linking principle merely required the use of 
weapons, it would have stated that. Rather, the linking principle establishes a 
quasi-causal relation between the non-protected civilian and the larger armed 
conﬂ ict. Unfortunately, though, nobody really knows what constitutes “direct 
participation” in an armed conﬂ ict. Th e term is undeﬁ ned in the Optional 
Protocol and there is little case law on the subject. Th e International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) notes that it is clear that the “lawfulness of an attack on 
a civilian depends on what exactly constitutes direct participation in hostilities 
and, related thereto, when direct participation begins and when it ends . . . [but] 
the meaning of direct participation in hostilities has not yet been clariﬁ ed,” 
and concedes that a legal deﬁ nition of the term does not even exist.25 Th e ICRC 
Commentary cites the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights for the 
proposition that the concept of “direct participation” in hostilities means “acts 
which, by their nature or purpose, are intended to cause actual harm to enemy 
personnel and material.”26 Although this interpretation of the concept has some 
intuitive appeal, it reduces it to a causal criterion—not an inherently objection-
able result, although the type and closeness of causal relation is left similarly 
undeﬁ ned.
As any good lawyer knows, the real issue is never whether causation is present or 
not, but rather what type of causation (but-for, proximate, etc) and whether the 
causation between the act in question and the desired consequence is close enough 
to meet the applicable standard. Many genuinely civilian actions that patriotically 
22 See International Committee of the Red Cross, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005) vol. I, 19–24 (hereafter cited as ICRC Commentary).
23 See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conﬂ icts (Additional Protocol I), adopted June 8, 
1977, art. 51(3), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
24 Even civilians retain the right of individual self-defense, which might be one reason to retain 
small arms even in a conﬂ ict zone. Th is complicates the ascription of combatancy to individuals car-
rying weapons—a particular problem during the recent ﬁ ghting in Libya. See, e.g., Th om Shanker 
and Charlie Savage, “NATO Warns Libyan Rebels Against Attacking Civilians,” New York Times 
(March 31, 2011).
25 See ICRC Commentary, supra n. 22, 173, vol. 1, 21.
26 Ibid., vol. II, 114.
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support a nation’s interest would eventually and predictably cause some harm to 
enemy personnel, but no one would ever suggest that they constitute direct partici-
pation in hostilities.27
One can imagine a spectrum of participatory acts. At one end of the spectrum are 
acts that unquestionably represent acts of combatancy, such as ﬁ ring a weapon 
at the enemy. No one doubts that this constitutes direct participation. At the 
other end of the spectrum, one might place activities such as a civilian seamstress 
who sews uniforms in a civilian factory that will one day be worn by soldiers. Or 
consider the cook who resides far from the battleﬁ eld and makes frozen food, 
some of which will be sold to the military for inclusion in MREs (Meals Ready 
to Eat). Th is clearly does not rise to the level of direct participation. In the mid-
dle of the spectrum are the hard cases: the civilian contractor who repairs a tank 
on the battleﬁ eld, or the civilian defense department employee who helps design 
or deploy a new weapons system. Are these individuals directly participating in 
hostilities?28
One way to get a handle on direct participation is to compare it with indirect 
participation. Th e ICRC Commentary cites the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights for the proposition that “mere support” of the military eﬀ ort by 
civilian personnel—including commercial sales and “expressing sympathy for 
the cause of one of the parties”—constitutes indirect participation.29 Th e asserted 
rationale for this conclusion is that these forms of participation do not involve “acts 
of violence which pose an immediate threat of actual harm to the adverse party.”30 
Th e concept of immediacy appears to be doing all of the work here, though it is 
unclear if immediacy is as signiﬁ cant as the Inter-American Commission believes 
it to be. Similarly, the ICRC notes that a draft statute for the future International 
Criminal Court deﬁ ned participating in hostilities to include scouting, spying, 
and sabotage, but excluded food deliveries and household domestic staﬀ  “in an 
oﬃ  cer’s married accommodation.”31
At Nuremberg, Streicher, Goebels, and others who ran the Nazi propaganda eﬀ ort 
were held responsible for aiding the Nazi war machine.32 Indeed, Streicher was 
charged with criminal responsibility for his writings, which in today’s legal climate 
would have been described as direct and public incitement to commit genocide, in 
27 Cf. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 3d edn. (Basic Books, 2000) 146.
28 Th e United States Naval Handbook states that guards, lookouts, and intelligence acts all meet 
the direct participation standard. See ICRC Commentary, supra n. 22, 173, vol. 1, 22.
29 Ibid., vol. II, 114 (citing Th ird Report on Human Rights in Columbia, Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/
II.102 Doc. 9 rev. 1, February 26, 1999, paras 53–6).
30 Ibid.
31 ICRC Commentary, supra n. 22, 173, vol. II, 116.
32 Reifenstahl might also be included in that list, though she was never prosecuted for her 
ﬁ lms.
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the words of the Rome Statute.33 When NATO bombed Serb positions in order to 
pressure Serbia to withdraw forces from Kosovo, the targets included Serbian state 
television and other elements of the state’s communications regime.34 Although 
reasonable persons can disagree over the permissibility of these attacks, I take it 
that the disagreement stems more from the civilian nature of the employees at the 
state television station, rather than the indirect nature of their causal contribu-
tion to the war eﬀ ort. In many of these situations, the causal role played by the 
non-military civilians is quite substantial and might even be described as direct.35 
Perhaps this is the reason that the US Naval Handbook simply concludes that the 
direct participation standard “must be judged on a case-by-case basis.”36
Th e ICRC’s latest eﬀ ort, its Interpretative Guidance on Direct participation in 
Hostilities, also cashes out the concept in causal terms.37 Indeed, according to the 
ICRC, the word “direct” in the legal standard explicitly refers to direct causa-
tion as opposed to indirect causation.38 According to the ICRC’s metaphysics, a 
direct causal result implies that the “harm in question must be brought about in 
one causal step.”39 In applying this standard, the ICRC Interpretative Guidance 
concludes that building or maintaining the ﬁ ghting capacity of one party to the 
conﬂ ict is not suﬃ  ciently direct because it is a two-step process. Even recruitment 
of combatants and their military training are excluded because they are two-step 
processes.40 Temporal and geographic proximity may imply causal proximity, but 
they do not wholly determine it, since an action could (in theory) directly cause a 
particular harm far removed in time and space.41
33 See Judgment, Streicher, International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg; D.F. Orentlicher, 
Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v. Nahimana, 21 American University 
Int’ l L. Rev. (2006) 557, 582–3.
34 Final Report to the Prosecutor by the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, 39 I.L.M. 1257 (2000).
35 Cf. Sandoz, Swinarski and Zimmerman, Commentary on the Additional Protocols (Martinus 
Nijhoﬀ  Publishers, 1987) 619 (discussing distinction between direct participation in hostilities and 
the more general participation in the war eﬀ ort and noting that “even the morale of the population 
plays a role in this context,” but concluding that without a distinction between direct and general 
participation “international humanitarian law could become meaningless”).
36 See ICRC Commentary, supra n 22, 173, vol. I, 24. However, the US Air Force handbook oﬀ ers 
additional examples: civilian ground observers that report the approach of hostile aircraft and res-
cuers of downed military airmen. See ibid., vol. II, 117.
37 Interpretative Guidance, (International Committee of the Red Cross, 2009), 1019 (requiring a 
“direct causal link between a speciﬁ c act and the harm likely to result either from that act, or from a 
coordinated military operation of which that act constitutes an integral part.”).
38 Ibid. at 1021.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. at 1022 (but concluding that if recruitment and training are for a particular hostile act, 
these activities are considered “integral” to the hostile act and therefore stand in a one-step causal 
relation to the harm).
41 Ibid. at 1023.
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Th e direct participation standard is diﬃ  cult to apply to terrorists, and there is 
currently little uniform state practice that would shed light on the content of the 
alleged customary norm. On the one hand, some nations take a purely causal 
approach to the notion, whereby any civilian who contributes to the armed conﬂ ict 
loses protected status. For example, India believes that any person who “contrib-
utes towards the furtherance of armed conﬂ ict” is no longer a protected civilian.42 
On the other hand, some countries conclude that “persons who merely provided 
support to the enemy . . . for example those who supplied it with weapons, food or 
medicine,” do not lose their protected status.43 In between, some nations recognize 
the inherent ambiguity and lack of clarity in the standard. For example, Israeli 
practice notes that the carrying of arms is not a suﬃ  cient condition for losing pro-
tected status, since in many locations (for example, Lebanon), civilians routinely 
carry ﬁ rearms even though they have nothing to do with the hostilities, though the 
Israel report notes that “when returning ﬁ re, it is extremely diﬃ  cult (and probably 
unwise from a military viewpoint) to diﬀ erentiate between those individuals actu-
ally ﬁ ring their ﬁ rearms and those just carrying them.”44
Th e ambiguity becomes starker when one considers another linking principle that 
is often applied to terrorists: providing material support to terrorists. Th e United 
States considers this to be a war crime and a violation of both federal and interna-
tional law.45 Does providing material support for terrorism constitute direct partici-
pation in hostilities? Did Hamdan “directly participate” in the hostilities because 
he was driving Osama bin Laden?46 Th e thing about providing material support is 
that it rests squarely on the shoulders of a causal contribution to the larger eﬀ ort. If 
the individual’s actions make a terrorist attack more likely—for example, if he aids 
or abets the larger eﬀ ort—then the individual has provided material support to 
terrorism.47 Consequently, providing ﬁ nancial support or engaging in advocacy on 
behalf of a terrorist cause can constitute material support, since terrorist activities 
require far more than just brute operational support.48 Many other forms of support 
are required to bring a terrorist plan to fruition. But providing ﬁ nancial support or 
ideological advocacy is a far cry from a direct participation in hostilities. What is 
missing is not a causal link, but the right kind of causal link.
42 Ibid., vol. II, 109.
43 Ibid., vol. II, 121.
44 Ibid., vol. II, 120–1. See also Shanker and Savage, “NATO Warns” supra n 24, 175.
45 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A and 2339B.
46 Cf. George P. Fletcher, “On the Crimes Subject to Prosecution in Military Commissions,” 5 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2007) 39.
47 Ibid. (“Virtually any aid or assistance to an organization labeled terrorist would be suﬃ  cient 
to trigger liability. Under these provisions, Bin Laden’s driver would clearly be guilty for providing 
‘transportation.’ Anyone who contributes money to terrorist organizations (or one so denominated) 
is guilty.”).
48 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2720 (2010).
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Although everyone agrees that direct participation requires the right kind of causal 
link, distinguishing between a direct and indirect causal contribution is far from 
easy. Th e “one-step” view espoused by the ICRC Interpretative Guidance appears 
to boil down to the idea that the causal contribution must be operational and on 
the battleﬁ eld, while indirect contributions emanate from beyond the conﬁ nes 
of battleﬁ eld activity as they have been traditionally deﬁ ned.49 But this is not so 
obvious.50 Directness appeals to the closeness of the causal route, which may or 
may not accord with a battleﬁ eld movement. It is, for example, possible to envi-
sion a close ﬁ nancial connection as well as a remote battleﬁ eld connection. Each 
of these possibilities puts pressure on our intuition that the concept of directness 
correlates essentially with prototypical battleﬁ eld activity.51 In other words, the 
closeness of the causal connection and the shape of the causal route can slip apart. An 
individual might engage in activity that has only a remote bearing on the hostilities 
(for example, bearing a weapon when there is no enemy in sight), but the relation 
between the action and the hostilities can be seen in a straight line. In contrast, an 
individual might engage in activity that has a strong correlation with the hostilities 
(for example, transporting a crucial weapon that will change the tide of the battle), 
but the relation between the action and the hostilities involves a comparatively 
more circuitous route. At ﬁ rst glance, it is not clear whether the causal element of 
the direct participation standard ought to be understood with regard to closeness 
or shape.52
(b)Co-belligerency under the law of neutrality
Another solution to the linking problem is to employ the doctrine of co-bel-
ligerency from the well-traveled law of neutrality.53 Under this doctrine, states 
engaged in an international armed conﬂ ict are allowed to consider third-party 
49 See ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra n. 37, 1021 (defending one-step causal criterion over 
allegedly wider alternatives such as “materially facilitating harm”).
50 Th e one-step view of causation was controversial among the ICRC working group members. 
Compare, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: Th e 
Constitutive Elements”, 42 N.Y.U. Journal of International Law & Policy (2010) 697, 727, with 
Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 865–8 (defending one-step causal relation). In particu-
lar, Melzer concludes that Schmitt’s more permissive deﬁ nition of causation amounts to an “unlim-
ited causal chain” that would extend as far downstream as the causal relation extends, including 
individuals who design, manufacture, and store weaponry. Ibid. at 868. Melzer concludes that 
although this wide causal criterion would be appropriate for ex post determination of criminal 
responsibility, it is inappropriate for an ex ante determination of combatancy under the direct par-
ticipation standard. Ibid.
51 Th e ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra n. 37, 1022, goes part of the way to understanding this 
issue by noting that the concept of directness must be understood within the context of the collec-
tive nature of the hostilities, such that individual actions may produce little causation on their own, 
but when aggregated together, contribute to the collective hostilities. However, even the notion of 
collective hostilities does not resolve the tension between directness and shape of the causal route.
52 Th e laity’s common-sense understanding of the concept of directness arguably includes an 
ambiguity with regard to closeness vs. shape.
53 See Fleck, Th e Handbook, supra n.12, 173, 576–7.
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states as co-belligerents of the enemy and thus subject to attack. However, third-
party states must ﬁ rst be given the opportunity to declare their neutrality in the 
conﬂ ict, and only if they refuse to remain neutral can they be declared co-bel-
ligerents of the enemy and thereby subject to lawful attack.54 Th e application of 
this doctrine can be quite controversial, in particular whether a state can feign 
neutrality and yet oﬀ er limited assistance to an ally and remain free from attack.55 
Th is can be referred to as a form of benevolent neutrality, or the idea that a state 
may “discriminate” against one side of the conﬂ ict without necessarily becoming 
a full co-belligerent in the conﬂ ict.56
Th e deeper problem with the doctrine of co-belligerency is whether it can be suc-
cessfully transplanted from the original state-based system of public international 
law into the new realm of non-state actors like Al Qaeda. Bradley and Goldsmith 
have argued that terrorists who are “co-belligerents” of Al Qaeda are by extension 
engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the United States by virtue of their status as 
co-belligerents.57 However, in Al-Bihani, a U.S. federal court rejected application 
of the doctrine to the war against Al Qaeda, concluding that the doctrine was 
rooted in traditional public international law notions of state sovereignty and that 
any “attempt to apply the rules of co-belligerency to such a force would be folly, 
akin to this court ascribing powers of national sovereignty to a local chapter of the 
Freemasons.”58
Indeed, the law of neutrality is based on the idea that states have a duty to declare 
themselves either oﬃ  cially neutral in a conﬂ ict or throw their lot in with one 
side of the conﬂ ict over the other—thus sharing the advantages of victory but 
also sharing the burdens of defeat. In the words of Francis Lieber, they advance 
and retrograde together.59 Th e problem is that irregular ﬁ ghting forces are not 
similarly situated with their enemies in an analogous fashion to states within 
the global Westphalian system.60 All states in the Westphalian system enjoy the 
sovereignty associated with the formal equality of nation-states; one expression 
of this sovereignty is the ability to form strategic alliances, declare war, engage in 
armed conﬂ ict, sign peace treaties, and return to peaceful relations with an enemy 
54 Ibid.
55 W. Heintschel von Heinegg, ‘ “Benevolent” Th ird States in International Armed Conﬂ ict,’ 
in M. Schmitt and J. Pejic, International Law and Armed Conﬂ ict: Exploring the Faultlines (Nijhoﬀ  
Leiden, 2007) 543–68.
56 Ibid.
57 See Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” supra 
n.18, 2112.
58 Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 873 (D.C. Cir. 2010). Th e issue is also discussed by 
Kevin Jon Heller, D.C. Circuit Rejected “Co-Belligerency” in Al-Bihani, opiniojuris.org (October 17, 
2010), available at <http://opiniojuris.org/2010/10/17/dc-circuit-rejects-co-belligerency/> accessed 
November 4, 2011.
59 US General Order No. 100, April 24, 1863 (the Lieber Code), art. 20.
60 See also L. Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (1906) vol. 2, § 74.
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state. Non-state actors are neither sovereign entities nor do they enjoy the capaci-
ties that ﬂ ow directly from this sovereignty. Nonetheless, Bradley and Goldsmith 
have argued that the U.S. president is permitted to target individual terrorists who 
are co-belligerents of Al Qaeda.61 Th e invocation of the concept of co-belligerency 
allows them to connect the individual terrorist with a ﬁ ghting force that is cur-
rently engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the United States. Th ey invoke this 
rationale to demonstrate that such targeted killings comply with the congres-
sional authorization that was provided to the president in the Authorization for 
the Use of Military Force (AUMF) passed after the September 11 attacks.62
Th e concept of co-belligerency is built around the notion that combatants ﬁ ghting 
against a common enemy—even if they are not ﬁ ghting on a uniﬁ ed front—can 
be linked together simply by virtue of their common enemy. Th e old adage that the 
enemy of my enemy is my friend best expresses the principle. Simply by virtue of 
standing in the common relationship of belligerency against the same enemy, two 
entities become co-belligerents.
Th e key thing to remember about the doctrine of co-belligerency, as it exists in the 
law of neutrality, is that it is built around the notion of publicity. Co-belligerents 
are not deﬁ ned simply around their actions on the battleﬁ eld. Rather, third-party 
states must be allowed the opportunity to publicly declare their neutrality in the 
conﬂ ict, and only if they forgo this opportunity may they be labeled co-belliger-
ents and subject to attack. Th is publicity criterion works well for sovereign entities 
such as states that are capable of exercising foreign relations. It is less clear how this 
translates into the domain of individual terrorists who are deﬁ ned as co-belliger-
ents of Al Qaeda. Th ey are not given the formal opportunity to declare their neu-
trality, nor are they given a conventional form of notice that they are being declared 
a co-belligerent of Al Qaeda, except in the generic sense that the United States 
has publicly declared that all militants are subject to attack unless they foreswear 
allegiance to Al Qaeda or the Taliban. But this certainly does not meet the formal 
requirements of the law of neutrality, nor does it capture its underlying spirit of 
publicity.
(c) Military membership
Th e traditional rules of IHL implicitly rely on a principle of membership in order 
to link an individual combatant with a larger ﬁ ghting force. Th e basic criteria 
for the ﬁ ghting force—the wearing of a military uniform, the display of a ﬁ xed 
emblem recognizable at a distance, the carrying of arms openly—deﬁ nes the 
collective ﬁ ghting force as a military organization that deserves the protection of 
61 Bradley and Goldsmith, “Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism,” supra 
n.18, 2113.
62 Ibid.
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IHL.63 However, the basic criteria also help deﬁ ne the individuals who belong to 
the organization. Determining membership is based on the fact that individuals in 
the military wear uniforms, display ﬁ xed emblems, and carry their arms openly (to 
the extent that they use weapons); this in turn publicly signals to the world that the 
individual is part of the ﬁ ghting force.
Membership is important because it provides a public criterion that is compara-
tively easy to establish.64 Th e link is established simply by virtue of signing up 
with the military, being drafted, or donning a uniform. No deeper investigation is 
required. Indeed, it does not even matter if the combatant actually engages in com-
batancy. His status as a combatant is established simply by virtue of his joining the 
military organization, regardless of whether he actually ﬁ res his weapon and kills 
an enemy soldier.65 Th e link is easily administered, public, and clear for both sides 
of a conﬂ ict (and even third parties) to identify the relevant individuals. So there is 
comparatively little ambiguity about membership in a military organization.
Unfortunately, membership in a terrorist organization does not demonstrate any 
of the hallmarks that IHL typically assigns to membership in a military organi-
zation.66 Terrorists do not wear uniforms or display ﬁ xed emblems, nor do they 
carry arms openly.67 Perﬁ dy and deception are essential tools that allow the ter-
rorist to complete his deadly craft. It may be the case that membership in a terror-
ist organization may have other essential attributes, but they are undeniably not 
the same attributes that IHL assigns to military organizations.68 Th e standard 
IHL categories were speciﬁ cally designed to link the individual soldier with war-
ring collectives that are the traditional subjects of public international law (that 
63 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 
1949, opened for signature August 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
64 See, e.g., William Bradford, “In the Minds of Men: A Th eory of Compliance with the Laws of 
War,” 36 Ariz. St. L.J. (2004) 1243, 1269 (identifying transparency as one factor that determines 
whether states comply with IHL speciﬁ cally and legal regimes generally).
65 But see Fleck, Th e Handbook, supra n. 12, 80 (concluding that members of the armed forces 
who do not take direct part in hostilities are non-combatants); Prosecutor v. Halilovic, ICTY Trial 
Chamber, No. IT-01-48-T (November 16, 2005) para. 34.
66 See, e.g., Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Awad v. Obama, 608 F.3d 
1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (membership in “command structure” is a suﬃ  cient but not necessary condi-
tion for legal determination that detainee is a member of Al Qaeda). For a discussion, see also John 
B. Bellinger III and Vijay M. Padmanabhan, “Detention Operations in Contemporary Conﬂ icts: 
Four Challenges for the Geneva Conventions and Other Existing Law,” 105 AJIL (2011) 201, 220 
(discussing need for workable criteria for detention of unlawful combatants based on their status).
67 Nils Melzer, “Keeping the Balance Between Military Necessity and Humanity: A Response 
to the Four Critiques of the ICRC’s Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation 
in Hostilities,” 42 NYU Journal of International Law & Politics (2010) 831, 843 (distinguishing 
functional from formal concepts of membership).
68 See Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂ ict Research, Harvard University, “IHL and 
Civilian Participation in Hostilities in the OPT,” Policy Brief, October 2007, 10 (“Th e end of mem-
bership must be objectively communicated, posing the same intelligence problems as the aﬃ  rma-
tive disengagement approach above, especially given that many groups may not have oﬃ  cial rosters 
of membership, uniforms, or centralized housing.”).
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is, nation-states), and to provide a ﬁ rst gloss on Lieber’s assumption that indi-
vidual soldiers are linked to the collective such that they advance and retrograde 
together. With these criteria, however, the terrorist remains in limbo.
(i) Form vs. function One might solve this problem by moving from a formal 
concept of membership to a functional concept of membership.69 Formal mem-
bership is built around formal indicia such as membership lists, the wearing of 
uniforms, and de jure requirements of domestic law, while the functional concept 
of membership can be determined by the individual’s role and function within 
the organization.70 For the functional deﬁ nition of membership, it is particularly 
relevant whether the individual received and carried out orders from the organi-
zation’s hierarchy.71 Th e application of the formal concept of membership, with 
its emphasis on de jure considerations, may not map onto the “the more informal 
and ﬂ uctuating membership structures of irregularly constituted armed forces 
ﬁ ghting on behalf of State and non-State belligerents.”72
In contrast, the functional version of the concept takes that informal structure as 
given and determines membership based on the individual’s place within—and 
relationship to—that hierarchy, even if that hierarchy is nebulous, irregular, or 
constantly shifting. Th e result is a version of the membership concept that can 
actually be applied to terrorist organizations, even if they are ill-deﬁ ned and lack 
the same rigorous structure of state military organizations. Although the func-
tional concept of membership is far less public and transparent than the formal 
concept of membership, it retains the essential characteristics of a membership 
criterion insofar as it is nominally based on an individual’s status as a member of a 
terrorist organization.
(d) Control
One might connect an individual terrorist with Al Qaeda—and the armed conﬂ ict 
between Al Qaeda and the United States—with a control test. Under this view, 
the individual is linked to the collective if Al Qaeda “controls” the actions of the 
individual. Th is principle has its genesis in public international law and the stand-
ard that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) imposed in the Nicaragua case 
to determine whether the actions of an armed group could be attributed to a state 
69 See Interpretive Guidance, supra n. 37, 1005 (concluding that membership in military organi-
zations is based on “formal integration into permanent units distinguishable by uniforms, insignia 
and equipment” but that membership in irregular groups requires functional criteria).
70 For an example, see Al Waraﬁ  v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (D.D.C. 2010) (functional 
approach requires determination that the individual “functioned or participated within or under 
the command structure of the Taliban—i.e. whether he received and executed orders or direc-
tions”); Hamlily, 616, F. Supp. 2d at 75 (same).
71 Al Waraﬁ  v. Obama, 704 F. Supp. 2d 32, 38 (but noting that knowledge and intent is required 
and excluding those who “unwittingly become part of the apparatus”).
72 See Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n.67, 845 (defending relevance of functional criteria 
for membership).
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for purposes of assigning state responsibility for the group’s actions.73 Th e court 
concluded that state responsibility existed in cases of eﬀ ective control of the group’s 
actions. In Nicaragua, the United States was found not be in control of the contras 
because, although the US was found to be involved in “planning, direction and sup-
port” of the contras’ paramilitary activities, there was insuﬃ  cient evidence that the 
United States “directed or enforced the perpetuation of the acts contrary to human 
rights and humanitarian law alleged by the applicant State.”74
Th ere are other versions of the control principle. Th e International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) famously rejected the ICJ’s eﬀ ective control test 
and formulated a diﬀ erent standard based on overall control.75 Under this new 
standard, control by the state requires more than mere ﬁ nancing or providing mili-
tary equipment, but the standard stops short of the strict standard imposed by the 
ICJ. Th e overall control standard is met by the planning and supervision of military 
activities in general, without requiring that the planning or oversight extend down to 
the level of speciﬁ c military attacks.76 A more general level of planning or supervision 
can constitute overall control of the paramilitary organization even in the absence of 
speciﬁ cally directing the organization’s military operations.
Th e problem with borrowing either of these control principles and applying 
them to the War on Terror is that many of the individuals who are targeted 
by the Administration are not controlled by Al Qaeda, even under the looser 
version of the standard articulated by the ICTY. In some cases, to be sure, 
the individual’s activities may indeed be directed by Al Qaeda. In other situa-
tions, however, the individual will be aﬃ  liated with a regional terrorist organi-
zation with very loose ties to the Al Qaeda parent group. Originally, Al Qaeda 
represented a deﬁ ned organization with speciﬁ c individuals committed to a 
particular political objective. But the organization has now transformed into 
a looser confederation of like-minded fellow travelers, many of whom are ﬁ ght-
ing separate armed conﬂ icts in diﬀ erent regions of the globe. Th ese conﬂ icts 
include diﬀ erent enemies, diﬀ erent objectives, and diﬀ erent techniques, though 
they might share an overarching ideological commitment to violent jihadism. 
Consequently, in many situations, the parent organization may provide ideo-
logical and rhetorical support but no direct or even general operational control 
over the local terrorist organization.
One solution to this problem is to redeﬁ ne the armed conﬂ ict as not against Al 
Qaeda per se but rather the long list of more local organizations that are engaged 
73 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), June 
27, 1986, ICJ Reports (1986).
74 Ibid. at 64–5 (emphasis added).
75 See Prosecutor v. Tadic, ICTY Appeals Chamber, Case No. IT-94-1-A, para. 137.
76 Ibid.
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in terrorist activities.77 Th is might alleviate the need to use the control principle 
in the ﬁ rst place, but the strategy can only be imperfectly applied. To the extent 
that a pre-existing local organization is involved in a bona ﬁ de armed conﬂ ict 
with the United States, the strategy works. However, many of these sub-groups 
might be so localized that they could not be said to be engaged in a declared 
armed conﬂ ict with the United States. Furthermore, some of these local groups 
might be so loosely organized that even the local group does not “control”—
either eﬀ ectively or overall—the actions of the individual terrorist.
(e) Complicity and conspiracy
Another solution is to import the doctrine of complicity from the domain of crimi-
nal law as a way of linking the individual terrorist to a larger group engaged in 
armed conﬂ ict with the United States. Th e doctrine of complicity implicitly relies 
on a causal notion, in the sense that complicity liability is generated by an indi-
vidual’s contribution (or attempted contribution) to a criminal endeavor, just as 
long as the contribution makes the completion of the crime more likely.78 Th is broad 
notion of complicity has increasingly been used as a paradigm to understand an 
individual’s contribution to a national collective endeavor of war-making.79 Th e 
importation of a criminal law notion into the domain of public international law 
may, at ﬁ rst glance, appear strange, but the concept’s intuitive appeal is undeniable. 
At ﬁ rst glance, the only diﬀ erence between the classical criminal law situation and 
the situation of a national armed struggle is the size of the collective endeavor to 
which the contribution is made.80 Th e other side of the equation—the individual, 
as well as his relationship to the collective—remains the same. Furthermore, the 
case under consideration here (the individual contributing to the collective terrorist 
organization) stands in between the classical criminal law paradigm and the state-
based paradigm of international conﬂ icts inherent in public international law. Th is 
broad notion of complicity in a collective endeavor is also encoded in Article 25(3)
(d) of the Rome Statute, which scholars have interpreted as criminalizing a form of 
residual complicity in a collective criminal endeavor.81 Although terrorism is not a 
discrete international crime under the Rome Statute, the mode of liability codiﬁ ed 
in Article 25(3)(d) represents a similar invocation of the concept of complicity in 
77 Th e concept of the “War on Terror” represents an even wider solution, where the enemy is ter-
rorism itself. However, this is just as nonsensical as declaring a War on War or a War on Enemies, 
with the opponent being deﬁ ned as anyone who threatens aggressive action. Th is eviscerates the 
notion of an armed conﬂ ict against a deﬁ ned enemy.
78 Compare Sanford H. Kadish, “Complicity, Cause and Blame: A Study in the Interpretation 
of Doctrine,” 73 California Law Review (1985) 323, 343 and John Gardner, “Complicity and 
Causality,” 1 Criminal Law and Philosophy (2007) 127, with Christopher Kutz, “Causeless 
Complicity,” I Criminal Law And Philosophy (2007) 289.
79 See, e.g., Christopher Kutz, “Th e Diﬀ erence Uniforms Make: Collective Violence in Criminal 
Law and the Law of War,” 33 Philosophy and Public Aﬀ airs (2005) 148.
80 Cf. ibid. at 153.
81 Th e provision was interpreted by the ICC in Lubanga, ¶ 337.
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group action. Th e federal crime of providing material support for terrorism is also 
built around the notion of complicity.82
Th e causal element of criminal complicity picks up quite nicely the causal inter-
pretation of directly participating in hostilities. Under this view, it makes sense 
to target individual terrorists who are complicit in the larger collective conﬂ ict 
(whether one deﬁ nes the conﬂ ict as a criminal conﬂ ict or a war) because complicity 
represents a form of participation. In criminal law, this point is purely deﬁ nitional; 
complicity is deﬁ ned as a form of participation in criminal wrongdoing.83 A party 
to an armed conﬂ ict has every reason to target an individual whose actions contrib-
ute to—or were aimed at contributing to—their eventual defeat.
Th e question, however, is whether the causal element of criminal complicity 
is suﬃ  ciently direct as a linking principle to adequately serve as a gloss on the 
notion of directly participating in hostilities. Indeed, criminal law scholars 
often describe aiders and abettors—and other form of accomplices—as hav-
ing engaged in a form of indirect commission of the crime.84 True, at least some 
accomplices could be described as direct participants in the endeavor, but the 
criterion of complicity is notoriously broad and meant to capture a wider scope 
of participation that plays some causal role in the criminal endeavor, even if that 
causal role is somewhat attenuated. Even in criminal law, though, the causal 
role cannot be too attenuated; otherwise criminal liability is usually denied as 
inappropriate. But even still, the criminal law notion may capture a whole host 
of individuals whose indirect contributions to the endeavor make them crimi-
nally culpable (and hence subject to punishment) but perhaps not subject to the 
immediate and summary killing implicit in traditional combatancy under the 
standard rules of IHL.
One might attempt to tighten the complicity link by switching to the concept of 
conspiracy.85 Conspiracy as a mode of liability is arguably stricter than complicity, 
because it requires an underlying agreement between the individual and the asso-
ciated individuals.86 As applied to the terrorist, he would be linked to the terrorist 
organization because he has jointly agreed with other terrorists to pursue an armed 
struggle against the United States. Individuals who merely contribute to the cause, 
82 See Norman Abrams, “Th e Material Support Terrorism Oﬀ enses: Perspectives Derived from 
the (Early) Model Penal Code,” 1 Journal of National Security Law and Policy (2005) 5.
83 See George P. Fletcher, “Complicity,” 30 Israel Law Review (1996) 140.
84 Th is is also sometimes described as perpetration-by-means. See Rome Statute, art. 25(3)(a). 
See also MPC §2.06. For a discussion, see F. Jessberger, “On the Application of a Th eory of Indirect 
Perpetration in Al Bashir: German Doctrine at Th e Hague?,” 6 Journal of International Criminal 
Justice (2008) 853.
85 Conspiracy as a mode of liability is sometimes viewed as a separate doctrine from complicity, 
and occasionally as a subcategory of complicity (with accomplice liability being the other subcate-
gory). Th is ambiguity is immaterial for our purposes here.
86 18 U.S.C. §371.
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without an underlying agreement for joint action, would not be linked to the col-
lective under the conspiracy doctrine.87
It makes sense to view terrorism through the lens of conspiracy. Terrorists pursue 
an unlawful objective through conspiratorial means: agreeing to a course of action, 
collective pursuit of common goals, secret and underground deliberations.88 
Moreover, the entire rationale of the conspiracy doctrine was to create an incho-
ate oﬀ ence of preparation for criminality that allows the authorities to intervene 
quickly in a burgeoning criminal endeavor. Whatever public policy rationale exists 
for intervening in domestic criminal conspiracies applies with equal or greater 
force to transnational conspiracies to commit acts of terrorism.
Having sketched out the terrain of possible linking principles, our task is now to 
evaluate their comparative strengths and weaknesses, both from the perspective 
of positive law (for example, support in treaty or customary law) as well as com-
pliance with the underlying normative principles of international law. Th at being 
said, this investigation cannot prejudge the correct paradigm, that is, whether 
the most appropriate normative principles are those underlying the law enforce-
ment paradigm or the law of war paradigm, or a combination of both. Section 
IV will pursue this goal by pursuing a comparative evaluation of the linking 
principles.
IV. A comparative evaluation of the linking principles
When can an individual be linked to a collective group for purposes of being 
selected for a targeted killing? A comparative analysis of the linking principles 
reveals that an individual can be linked either through status alone or by virtue of a 
more discrete action. So membership in a military organization, by virtue of wear-
ing a uniform or displaying a ﬁ xed symbol, confers a status on the individual that 
links him to the collective ﬁ ghting force. Similarly, the concept of co-belligerency 
from the law of neutrality involves a status-like element by virtue of a belligerent’s 
refusal to declare itself neutral in a conﬂ ict.
It should come as no surprise that IHL relies on the linking principle of mem-
bership in a military organization, given how much is at stake. If individuals are 
linked for purposes of IHL, they gain the privilege of combatant immunity as 
well as opening themselves to the risk of reciprocal killing. Individuals who meet 
these criteria know that they meet these criteria, and moreover, their enemies 
know this as well. In fact, the public nature of the linking principle is internal to 
the principle itself, because the link is built around the criteria of uniforms, ﬁ xed 
emblems, and weaponry—all of which are designed to publicly convey to one’s 
87 However, they would be guilty of providing material support.
88 On this point, see generally J.D. Ohlin, “Group Th ink: Th e Law of Conspiracy and Collective 
Reason,” 98 J. Criminal Law and Criminology (2007) 147, 201.
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enemy that the linking principle is fulﬁ lled. When so much is at stake, it makes 
sense for the linking principle to be self-publicizing and self-applying.
In contrast, the criminal law notions of conspiracy and complicity are causal cri-
teria that are far less public. Th e individual’s actions that link him to the collective 
are hardly public at all, because the actions of the terrorist are usually conducted 
covertly, far from the prying eyes of the enemy. Terrorists are more like spies than 
traditional combatants. Furthermore, the criteria for conspiracy or complicity are 
usually complicated and require the testing and fact-ﬁ nding process that domi-
nates the criminal trial. Allowing criminal law concepts to function as a linking 
principle cuts against the underlying nature of IHL, which necessarily relies on 
easy-to-administer criteria in the absence of a judicial system.
In light of this insight, section IV(a) will reconsider the virtues of membership as 
a linking principle, even though criminal law scholars have given it a bad name. 
Section IV(b) will then consider an updated version of the membership concept—
the continuous combat function—that avoids many of the anxieties that criminal 
law scholars have about membership principles. Finally, section IV(c) will com-
pare status and conduct principles and demonstrate that membership principles 
can be modiﬁ ed into a “functional membership” concept that represents a hybrid 
between status and conduct. Th e result is a legally defensible and philosophically 
coherent principle to link suspected terrorists with the non-state organizations that 
are ﬁ ghting the United States.
(a) Rethinking membership
We are therefore caught between two types of linking principles. Th e traditional 
IHL linking principles are both self-applying and public. Th e traditional criminal 
law linking principles are neither self-applying nor public, since they require a 
comparatively larger degree of fact-ﬁ nding to determine if their standards are met. 
At which end of the spectrum should we place targeted killings? Should targeted 
individuals be linked with the underlying principles of IHL or the criminal law?
Functionally, targeted killings are much closer to the summary killings that 
are inherent to IHL on the battleﬁ eld. Although the criminal law concepts of 
conspiracy and complicity cast a wide net, this looseness is mitigated by the fact 
that the criminal law system aﬀ ords defendants a chance to contest the causal 
linkage before a neutral decision-maker.89 No such right exists on the battleﬁ eld, 
which is precisely why the linking principles used by IHL are much narrower.90 
Although many individuals might be causally responsible for helping the war 
89 See generally Larry May, Global Justice and Due Process (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
117.
90 Cf. Richard Murphy and Afsheen John Radsan, “Due Process and the Targeted Killing of 
Terrorists,” 31 Cardozo Law Review (2009) 405, 409; May, Global Justice and Due Process, supra n. 
89, 154.
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eﬀ ort, the rules of IHL limit automatic killing to soldiers in uniform (and civil-
ians directly participating in hostilities). Although this classiﬁ cation might be 
seriously limited, the whole structure of IHL is built around the notion that the 
reciprocal risk of killing should be underbroad rather than overbroad, precisely 
because there is no opportunity to contest a determination on the battleﬁ eld. Th e 
uniformed soldier on the battleﬁ eld cannot complain that he was killed before he 
could contest his status, because he was wearing a uniform.
(i) A functional equivalent Targeted killings represent the same kind of sum-
mary killing that traditional combatants face on the battleﬁ eld. While conspiracy 
and complicity are strict enough for a system with a criminal process, they are not 
appropriate for summary execution outside of the judicial process. Th is suggests 
that however we link individuals to a collective for purposes of targeted killing, 
it ought to be with a linking principle that is closer to the IHL linking principles 
rather than criminal law linking principles. Th e correct linking principle would 
represent a functional equivalent to the IHL linking principle that governs the 
targeting of traditional combatants. Th e diﬀ erence would be that the functional 
equivalent ought to be tailored for the speciﬁ cs of the situation: a non-state group 
composed of individuals who pursue terrorism without a uniform.
Although it is diﬃ  cult to sketch out the exact contours of this hypothetical linking 
principle, it ought to lie somewhere between the doctrine of co-belligerency and 
membership in a military organization. Th e doctrine of co-belligerency, as under-
stood by the law of neutrality, has the advantage that it is based on both publicity 
and self-declared consent; the co-belligerent nation publicly refuses to aﬃ  rm its 
neutrality and is therefore declared a co-belligerent. Th e very same publicity and 
self-declared consent is performed by the individual soldier who dons a uniform. 
Both are then subject to summary attack under the laws of war, though one norm 
ﬂ ows from jus ad bellum and the other ﬂ ows from jus in bello. But the structure of 
both is remarkably similar.
Th e functional equivalent in cases of targeted killings would link the individ-
ual to the collective terrorist group if the individual is a card-carrying mem-
ber of a terrorist organization or a self-declared enemy of the United States.91 
Membership might be established in a number of ways, not simply by attending 
an Al Qaeda training camp.92 We are therefore left with the following linking 
91 In his UN report, Philip Alston denies that membership alone can be suﬃ  cient to identify 
a terrorist as an appropriate target for a killing. See U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum: Study on Targeted 
Killings, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/24/Add.6 (May 28, 2010) paras 65–6 (criticizing the ICRC stand-
ard of “continuous combat function” for its overreliance on membership and other status-based 
concepts). For a complete discussion of the ICRC notion of the continuous combat function, see 
infra section IV(b).
92 Although in many cases, prosecution is based precisely on attendance at a training camp. See, 
e.g., United States v. Hassoun, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85684 (D. Fla. 2007).
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principle: voluntary membership in an organization engaged in an armed conﬂ ict 
with the United States.93  his linking principle might at ﬁ rst glance sound too nar-
row, because terrorists might opportunistically avoid declaring their allegiances 
in order to avoid being targeted—an example of lawfare to be sure. But the anxi-
ety is misplaced. Th e very concept of terrorism hinges on publicity—publicity for 
a cause and a political objective, neither of which can be easily disowned without 
doing damage to the theater of violence implicit in terrorist attacks.94
(ii) Th e transitory requirement Th is conclusion is more than just normative-
philosophical. It is also a legal conclusion, in the sense that it can be understood 
as a gloss on the concept of direct participation in hostilities, the original require-
ment of jus in bello that explains when a civilian loses his or her protected status 
under IHL. On this point, one might object that this understanding—direct 
participation in hostilities in terms of self-declared membership in an organiza-
tion engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the United States—conﬂ icts with another 
aspect of the “direct participation” linking principle. Th e Optional Protocol with-
draws protection from civilians “for such time” as they are directly participating 
in hostilities.95 Th e ﬂ exible and temporal work performed by the concept of “for 
such time” suggests that the associated status (protected civilian vs. unprotected 
combatant) shifts constantly depending on the actions of the particular indi-
vidual. He can fall in and out of protection at each moment in time, depending 
on his conduct—without a reiﬁ ed status that endures throughout the individual’s 
existence. Th is approach was famously discussed by the Israeli Supreme Court in 
its Targeted Killings decision.96
Is this transitory requirement of the Optional Protocol consistent with membership 
in an organization engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the United States? Or is the 
latter far too status-oriented—that is, not suﬃ  ciently transitory and ﬂ exible—to 
accord with the “for such time” standard?97 It strikes me that the notion of self-
declared membership is, in fact, consistent with the transitory nature of the “for 
such time” standard. Individuals join and leave organizations all the time—just as 
93 For a discussion, see Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conﬂ ict Research, Harvard 
University, IHL and Civilian Participation in Hostilities in the OPT, October 2007, 10 (comparing 
“membership approach” with “limited membership approach” that restricts targeting to ﬁ ghting 
members of armed groups).
94 Fletcher, “Th e Indeﬁ nable Concept of Terrorism,” supra n.10, 909.
95 See Additional Protocol I, supra n. 23, 174, art. 51(3).
96 Public Committee Against Torture v. Israel (“Targeted Killings Case”), HCJ 769/02 (2005).
97 Th e “for such time” requirement is the subject of some controversy. Compare Bill Boothby, 
“ ‘And for such time as’: Th e Time Dimension to Direct Participation in Hostilities,” 42 NYU 
Journal of International Law & Politics (2010) 741, 764–5 (questioning the customary status of the 
norm and suggesting that the “for such time” requirement is limited to treaty signatories of the 
Additional Protocol), with Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 884–5 (stating that treaty 
is binding on 169 states and noting that even the Israeli High Court believes that the additional 
protocol requirement codiﬁ es customary law).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN
03_Altman_Ch02.indd   81 12/2/2011   9:12:47 AM
Targeted Killings
82
they join and leave criminal conspiracies—and such decisions are both legally and 
morally signiﬁ cant. Th e individual terrorist is subject to the risk of being killed “for 
such time” as he is a member of Al Qaeda, though he regains the core protections 
of IHL if and when he permanently leaves Al Qaeda. At that moment in time he 
becomes a subject of the criminal process again. Th is solution avoids some of the 
most perverse aspects of the revolving door problem, that is, the risk that terrorists 
will launch terrorist attacks but fall back into civilian status to shield themselves 
from the enemy.98 If the “for such time” criterion is linked to membership in the 
organization, such opportunistic shifts are dramatically more diﬃ  cult.
(b) Th e continuous combat function standard
Th is membership principle is arguably what the ICRC was getting at in its 
Interpretative Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation, which explicitly 
recognized the signiﬁ cance of engaging in a continuous combat function.99 
According to the Interpretative Guidance, membership in an armed group of a 
non-state party to a non-international armed conﬂ ict depends on whether the 
individual engages in a “continuous combat function.”100 Th e point of intro-
ducing the new continuous combat function criterion is to distinguish between, 
on the one hand, “members of the organized ﬁ ghting forces of a non-State party 
from civilians who directly participate in hostilities on a merely spontaneous, 
sporadic, or unorganized basis, or who assume exclusively political, administra-
tive or other non-combat functions.”101 Th e functional consequence of this dis-
tinction is to carve out a category under IHL that treats soldiers in a non-state 
military organization in analogous fashion (for example, according to member-
ship) to soldiers in a more traditional state-party military organization.
How is this distinction to be made? An individual is deemed to be engaged 
in a continuous combat function, as opposed to the more transitory and ﬂ eet-
ing direct participation in hostilities, if their “continuous function involves the 
preparation, execution, or command of acts or operations amounting to direct 
participation in hostilities are assuming a continuous combat function. An indi-
vidual recruited, trained and equipped by such a group to continuously and 
directly participate in hostilities on its behalf can be considered to assume a con-
tinuous combat function even before he or she ﬁ rst carries out a hostile act.”102 
98 Targeted Killings Case, supra n.96, para. 40 (discussing problem of revolving door and citing 
1 Kings 1:50 and Numbers 35:11).
99 See Interpretative Guidance, supra n. 37, 991, 1007–9. Th e document’s principal author was 
Nils Melzer, ICRC Legal Advisor, and was adopted by the Assembly of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross on February 26, 2009.
100 Ibid. 1007 (“membership must depend on whether the continuous function assumed by an 
individual corresponds to that collectively exercised by the group as a whole, namely the conduct of 
hostilities on behalf of a non-State party to the conﬂ ict”).
101 Ibid.
102 Ibid. at 1007–8.
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If one applies this standard to Al Qaeda, there is a plausible argument that these 
terrorists are trained to continuously operate as terrorists with the goal of pursu-
ing attacks against the United States and its allies. Moreover, there is a lasting 
integration of the individual into the collective, on whose behalf the individual is 
acting.103 Although many of these members have not yet ﬁ nalized an attack, they 
are engaged in the process of preparing, planning, or training for an attack. Th eir 
status as Al Qaeda terrorists therefore makes them subject to military attack.
Th e ICRC standard of engaging in a continuous combat function was (and 
remains) highly controversial when it was adopted by the Red Cross working 
group.104 Some scholars disapproved of the membership-oriented nature of the 
concept and believed that the concept of direct participation in hostilities ought 
to remain transitory and based solely on the actions of the individual at each 
moment in time.105 Furthermore, these scholars rejected the rationale that armed 
groups of a non-state party to an armed conﬂ ict ought to have a functional ana-
logue to membership in a state’s military organization.106 On the other hand, 
other scholars, including some who participated in the ICRC working group 
that developed the continuous combat function standard, criticized the proposal 
from the opposite direction, that is, sacriﬁ cing the principle of military necessity 
for the principle of humanity.107 Th ese criticisms were a natural outgrowth of a 
pre-existing anxiety about how IHL treats organized armed groups diﬀ erently 
depending on whether they are a state party or not. Members of a non-state 
armed organization receive the added protection of the “for such time” limita-
tion (and are consequently immune from targeting part of the time), while mem-
bers of a state party’s military organization are subject to attack purely on the 
basis of membership.108 Why should members of a non-state armed organization 
receive more protection under the customary rules of IHL, rather than less?
Th e continuous combat function standard was meant to be a solution to that 
problem. In fact, the ICRC Interpretative Guidelines apply the continuous combat 
function criterion both to non-international armed conﬂ icts and international 
103 Ibid. at 1007 (discussing lasting integration in an organized armed group as a requirement of 
the continuous combat function standard).
104 See Mezler, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 831, 834.
105 Ibid. at 835.
106 Ibid. (“while Schmitt contends that the Interpretive Guidance’s deﬁ nition of ‘direct partici-
pation in hostilities’ is too restrictive, essentially because it excludes support activities not directly 
causing harm to the enemy, other experts would criticize the Guidance’s deﬁ nition as too generous 
because, in certain circumstances, it might allow the targeting of civilians who do not pose an 
immediate threat to the enemy.”).
107 See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, “Opportunity Lost: Organized Armed Groups and the ICRC 
‘Direct Participation in the Hostilities’ Interpretive Guidance,” 42 NYU Journal of International 
Law & Politics (2010) 641.
108 Compare Watkin, “Opportunity Lost” supra n.107, 644, with Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” 
supra n.67, 851.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – REVISES, 12/02/11, NEWGEN
03_Altman_Ch02.indd   83 12/2/2011   9:12:47 AM
Targeted Killings
84
armed conﬂ icts, such that membership is limited to those individuals who display 
a continuous combat function as opposed to those who, like reservists, have a 
combat function that is “spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary” or “assume exclu-
sively political, administrative or other non-combat functions”109 Th e problem 
with the ICRC’s particular proposal is that it did not go far enough. According to 
at least some scholars, the requirement set up a diﬀ erent legal regime that provided 
an unfair and unwarranted advantage to insurgent groups.110 Only members of 
an organized armed group who evidence a continuous combat function could be 
lawfully targeted; all other members of the group can only be targeted for such 
time as they are directly participating in hostilities. By contrast, all members of a 
state’s military apparatus are subject to lawfully targeting, even a cook, regardless 
of whether they are directly participating in hostilities or not.111 From the point 
of view of this criticism, the proper remedy is to normalize the standard across all 
armed groups, whether state actors or non-state actors. In other words, member-
ship in both domains could be limited to those who display a continuous combat 
function or, in the alternative, membership in both domains could be expanded 
to all individuals and include the proverbial cook in both the state military and 
the insurgent group, so as to eliminate the unfair advantage conferred on the 
insurgents.112 Th is the Red Cross proposal does not do.
However, even if one sticks with the Red Cross proposal and applies the continuous 
combat function requirement just to insurgents, it may be the case that some insur-
gent groups are so entirely focused on planning and perpetrating military attacks 
that every member of the group is engaged in a continuous combat function.113 
109 ICRC Interpretative Guidance, supra n. 37, 1007.
110 See, e.g., Michael N. Schmitt, “Th e Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in 
Hostilities: A Critical Analysis,” Harvard National Security Journal (2010) 5, 23. See also Adam 
Roberts, “Th e Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle Under Pressure,” 90 International 
Review of the Red Cross (2008) 931.
111 Schmitt, “Th e Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis,” supra n. 110, 23. Melzer contends that the asymmetry is justiﬁ ed because even cooks 
in a traditional army “are not only entitled, but also trained, armed, and expected to directly par-
ticipate in hostilities in case of enemy contact and, therefore, also assume a continuous combat 
function.” See Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 852. Th e ICTY apparently disagrees. 
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Halilovic, No. IT-01-48-T (November 16, 2005) para. 34 (noting that while 
“membership of the armed forces can be a strong indication that the victim is directly participating 
in the hostilities, it is not an indicator which in and of itself is suﬃ  cient”). However, the only two 
counter-examples oﬀ ered by the ICTY Trial Chamber include non-mobilized reservists and civilian 
police oﬃ  cers incorporated de jure into the armed forces by domestic statute. Ibid., para. 34 n.78. 
For a brief discussion, see Ryan Goodman, “Th e Detention of Civilians in Armed Conﬂ ict,” 103 
AJIL (2009) 48, n.41.
112 But see Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n.67, 851.
113 For a discussion of the ambiguity in applying this criterion in these situations, compare 
Schmitt, “Deconstructing Direct Participation in Hostilities: Th e Constitutive Elements”, supra 
n.50, 727 (noting diﬃ  culty with deﬁ ning “capacity building” activities such as recruitment of sui-
cide bombers, procurement of materials, and assembly and storage of explosives), with Melzer, 
“Keeping the Balance,” supra n. 67, 865–6 (“whether an act constitutes a measure preparatory or 
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Th e U.S. administration has taken a similar view in habeas corpus proceedings 
in federal court arising out of Guantanamo Bay detentions.114 According to the 
Obama Administration, Al Qaeda is a military organization through-and-through, 
such that all members of the group are dedicated to planning, supporting, or execut-
ing future attacks in some way or another.115 Unlike other insurgent armed groups 
that also perform some political or civilian functions (for example, Hamas in Gaza 
or the Taliban in Afghanistan),116 Al Qaeda exists solely to plot terrorist attacks 
against designated targets; it has no positive political program of its own nor does it 
aspire to directly control territory through the operation of an Al Qaeda syndicate 
government. Is it therefore possible that all members of Al Qaeda and similar groups 
are engaged in a continuous combat function in some way or another?
(c) Status rules vs. conduct rules
Whether one accepts this argument or not, the real point is to emphasize that 
the entire discussion of the continuous combat function requirement takes place 
within the general context of membership as a linking principle. As good crimi-
nal law scholars, we are supposed to favor conduct rules over outcomes based on 
status alone. As criminal law professors we assign our students Martin v. State 
and drive home the proposition that the principle of culpability requires that 
we punish individuals solely for their blameworthy actions, not their status.117 
Th is argument is particularly relevant for the War on Terror, where the govern-
ment arguably uses status to determine who should be declared an unlawful 
combatant, interned at Guantanamo Bay, tried before a military commission, 
or even summarily killed by a drone attack.118 To some critics, this represents an 
unwarranted infringement on civil liberties in order to protect national secu-
rity. Under this view, if draconian consequences are required to protect our 
nation, they should only be visited upon an individual suspect if he has engaged 
otherwise integral to a speciﬁ c hostile act or operation, or whether it remains limited to general 
capacity-building, must be determined separately for each case, and it is clear that the same objec-
tive criteria must apply to all civilians, regardless of whether they happen to support an unsophisti-
cated insurgency or a technologically advanced State.”).
114 I am indebted to Marty Lederman on this point.
115 See, e.g., Al Bihani v. Obama, 594 F. Supp. 2d 35, 39–40 (concluding that despite petitioner’s 
contention that he was only a cook, he was also carrying a riﬂ e and ammunition and taking orders 
from an Al Qaeda military commander).
116 See Schmitt, “Th e Interpretative Guidance on Direct Participation in Hostilities: A Critical 
Analysis,” supra n.110, 23 (noting that Hamas and Hezbollah have political or social wings but also 
concluding that “while membership in an organized armed group can be uncertain, it may also be 
irrefutable”).
117 Martin v. State, 31 Ala. App. 334, 17 So. 2d 427 (Alabama 1944); Robinson v. California 
(status of being a drug addict). But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (upholding public 
intoxication statute),
118 See, e.g., Hamlily v. Obama, 616 F. Supp. 2d 63, (D.D.C. 2009) (status determination of 
membership is consistent with international laws of war)
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in proscribed conduct. Anything less represents a fundamental betrayal of the 
civil liberties enshrined in our constitutional structure.
However, the interplay between conduct and status is rich and complex and not so 
black and white. Status is often a shortcut for a history of repeated conduct, such 
that the status of being a drug addict or the status of appearing drunk in public 
are both, with limited exceptions,119 the product of component actions (consum-
ing alcohol or drugs) that we would naturally classify as conduct. Similarly, the 
building blocks of IHL demonstrate a complex relationship between conduct and 
status. Although membership in a military organization is usually described as a 
status, once one inquires about how this status is determined, one learns that the 
component requirements are wearing a uniform, the display of a ﬁ xed emblem rec-
ognizable at a distance, and the carrying of arms openly—all examples of conduct 
par excellence.120 It is rare, then, to have a case of status all the way down.
(i) Functional membership as a hybrid concept Th is is even more true when 
one considers a functional version of the concept of membership, which looks 
to the individual’s relationship to an organizational hierarchy and whether he 
receives and carries out orders from that command structure.121 Unlike a formal 
version of membership, which relies more heavily on status criteria, the func-
tional concept is half way on the road to a conduct rule. It relies on the status 
concept of membership but cashes out that standard by reference to what the 
individual is actually doing—not necessarily at each discrete moment in time, 
but rather from the broader perspective of a longer time period: taking orders 
from commanders, engaging in military operations at the behest of command-
ers, etc.122 In fact, one might describe the functional version of membership as 
a hybrid concept that straddles the distinction between status and conduct—an 
appropriate result for the context of terrorist organizations and other irregular 
119 Th ere are a few examples of status categories that are not reducible to an individual’s own 
actions, such as an infant drug addict who suﬀ ered from fetal intoxication in utero. In that case, the 
individual’s status is causally reducible to an individual action, but it is someone else’s action—the 
parent.
120 Melzer’s defense of the ICRC Interpretative Guidance appears to be insensitive to this dynamic 
relationship. e.g., Melzer argues that the asymmetry between state military organizations and non-
state armed groups is justiﬁ ed because “members of regular State armed forces are legitimate mili-
tary targets not because of the ‘functions they perform’ but because of their formal status as regular 
combatants.” See Melzer, “Keeping the Balance,” supra n.67, 851. Th is means that membership 
can either be based on “formal de jure integration” (for regular armed forces) or on “function de 
facto performed,” i.e. conduct (for irregular forces). Ibid. But at some level, even the formal de jure 
integration of the armed forces must be based, in part, on their conduct, as he implicitly recognizes 
when he points out that even cooks in the regular armed forces are always trained in basic combat 
functions.
121 See supra section III(c)(i) for a complete discussion of formal vs. functional membership.
122 See, e.g., Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 872–3 (functional membership based on 
“accompanying the brigade on the battleﬁ eld, carrying a brigade-issued weapon, cooking for the 
unit, and retreating and surrendering under brigade orders” even “in the absence of an oﬃ  cial 
membership card”).
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armed groups. Th e result is hardly Solomonic; rather, it merges the best of both 
worlds.
Th at being said, it would be an exaggeration to say that the distinction between 
conduct and status is wholly illusory. Th ere is a fundamental diﬀ erence between 
them, albeit one that is often obscured. A status usually represents a proxy for 
lower-level conduct. Proxies usually get a bad name in both law and philosophy, 
because it is natural to presume that if the lower-level facts generate the moral 
or legal signiﬁ cance, one ought to eliminate the higher-level proxy and deal 
exclusively with the lower-level elements. Under this view, the identiﬁ cation 
of a proxy suggests eliminativism as the proper course of action. Th is is a hasty 
conclusion because one ought to distinguish between crude proxies and suc-
cessful proxies. Crude proxies take a rough set of intuitions and create a shortcut 
that obscures the real signiﬁ cance of the underlying elements; what is gained in 
administrability and convenience is outweighed by the loss of accuracy.123 By 
contrast, successful proxies link together a diverse set of lower-level elements, 
solve evidentiary problems, and help root out inconsistencies.124 Th e question is 
whether the status concept under consideration in this chapter—membership 
in a terrorist organization engaged in a self-declared armed conﬂ ict—is the 
former or the latter.
Th ere is a plausible argument that the status concept that we have deployed 
here illuminates more than it obscures. First, it has obvious evidentiary value. 
Self-declared membership in an organized armed group is public and transpar-
ent; those who join a group dedicated to jihad can understand the position of 
conﬂ ict that they have placed themselves in. Second, third parties can monitor 
compliance with this norm with relative ease. By contrast, limiting targetabil-
ity based on the conduct of the targeted individual at each cardinal moment 
in time is comparatively less transparent and very diﬃ  cult for third parties to 
monitor. Th ese are precisely the considerations that originally sparked the use of 
status concepts such as membership in traditional IHL norms.125
123 Cf. Felix S. Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functionalist Approach,” 35 Colum. 
L. Rev. (1935) 809 (disparaging the legal utility of metaphysical concepts that have no precise 
meaning).
124 Similarly, see Jeremy Waldron, “ ‘Transcendental Nonsense’ and System in the Law,” 100 
Colum. L. Rev. (2000) 16 (concluding that metaphysical concepts in the law provide meaningful 
explanations when their explanatory circle is suﬃ  ciently large). See also Jens David Ohlin, “Is the 
Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights?,” 105 Colum. L. Rev. (2005) 209 (invoking 
Cohen and Waldron and concluding that metaphysical concepts often link together diverse propo-
sitions to promote coherence and root out inconsistencies in doctrine).
125 See Robert Chesney and Jack Goldsmith, “Terrorism and the Convergence of Criminal and 
Military Detention Models,” 60 Stan. L. Rev. (2008) 1079, 1084 (“Th e laws of war traditionally 
emphasize pure associational status as the primary ground for detention; individual conduct pro-
vides only a secondary, alternative predicate.”).
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(ii) Preserving civil liberties We are left, then, with a somewhat surprising 
result. Th e traditional dichotomy of national security vs. civil liberties turns out to 
be illusory.126 When viewed through the lens of domestic criminal law, the use of 
status concepts appears to threaten the principle of culpability and suggests that 
the proposed scheme impermissibility infringes civil liberties. But when viewed 
through the lens of IHL, the use of status concepts reveals itself to be entirely con-
sistent with the conceptual structure of IHL—a structure that is based largely on 
status concepts, and for good reason. To insist yet again that pure conduct alone 
should determine targetability is to import criminal law linking principles into a 
legal terrain—the battleﬁ eld—where the preferred linking principles are publicly 
observable and self-administering status concepts such as membership. Moreover, 
shifting to a hybrid status-conduct concept such as functional membership goes 
even further towards ensuring that truly innocent civilians fall outside the scope 
of legitimate targets.
How could this standard be administered? One might object that it is diﬃ  -
cult—if not impossible—to prove that any given individual is truly a member 
of a terrorist organization engaged in an armed conﬂ ict with the United States. 
After a targeted killing, who is to say that the killing did not live up to this stand-
ard? Th ere are two important answers here. Such problems of proof are endemic 
to all IHL norms governing civilians, and the current problem will be compara-
tively easier to administer when compared against a more transitory revolving 
door scheme. Second, the concept of joining and leaving a criminal organization 
is well worked out in the literature and case law on conspiracies, which in some 
jurisdictions imposes stringent requirements on individuals seeking to leave 
a criminal organization and escape the consequences of their membership.127 
Th ese standards sometimes require a public repudiation of the enterprise—ei-
ther to the leaders of the enterprise or to the relevant authorities.128 Th is is a high 
standard to meet, and appropriately so in the case of domestic criminal law.129
Applied to terrorists, the standard would require a public declaration repudiating 
the armed conﬂ ict against the United States before they could regain their protected 
126 Cf. S. Macdonald, “Why we Should Abandon the Balance Metaphor,” 15 ILSA J. International 
& Comparative Law (2008–2009) 95.
127 Compare Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) with United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 
438 U.S. 422, 464–5 (1978) (“Aﬃ  rmative acts inconsistent with the object of the conspiracy and 
communicated in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators have generally been 
regarded as suﬃ  cient to establish withdrawal or abandonment.”).
128 See, e.g., Al Ginco v. Obama, 626 F. Supp. 2d 123, 128 (D.D.C. 2009) (“prior relationship 
[with] al Qaeda . . . can be suﬃ  ciently vitiated by the passage of time, intervening events, or both”). 
See also Eldredge v. United States, 62 F.2d 449, 451 (10th Cir. 1932) (conspiracy).
129 See, e.g., ICRC Interpretive Guidance, supra n. 37, 1008 (“In practice, the principle of distinc-
tion must be applied based on information which is practically available and can reasonably be 
regarded as reliable in the prevailing circumstances.”).
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status.130 It is unlikely that any jihadist terrorist would opportunistically exploit this 
standard in order to falsely gain protected status. Even despite this fact, however, 
there are strong reasons to defend a modiﬁ ed standard for abandonment. Given 
that the criteria for membership is our previously identiﬁ ed hybrid concept of func-
tional membership, abandonment or renunciation would be demonstrated by the 
continued non-existence, for a sustained period of time, of the very factors that led 
to the ﬁ nding of functional membership in the ﬁ rst instance. If, for example, the 
individual no longer receives and carries out orders from the command hierarchy, 
this would necessarily entail that the individual is no longer a functional member 
of the terrorist organization. With this caveat, then, the hybrid concept should oﬀ er 
bona ﬁ de comfort to civil libertarians committed to conduct rules.
V. Conclusion
Th is new standard has the virtue that it avoids the “revolving door” problem noted 
by Justice Barak in the Israeli Supreme Court decision. In fact, the standard is 
more permanent than the transitory standard oﬀ ered by Justice Barak, yet it is 
not so permanent that it runs afoul of the “for such time” requirement of the 
Optional Protocol. Th e linking principle is easy to administer, self-applying, and 
based on semi-public criteria, which makes it a functional equivalent to being a 
member of a military organization. True, this new linking principle is not as easy 
to administer as the traditional IHL linking principle of being a member of a mili-
tary organization, but it is certainly easier to apply than the criminal law notions 
of conspiracy and complicity that require intensive fact-based determinations by 
a neutral decision-maker. Th e linking principle is consistent with the underlying 
legal principles embedded in the laws of war, as well as the legal instruments that 
codify them. Although the linking principle may not be as permissive as some gov-
ernments would wish, it is better to utilize a narrow linking principle that is legally 
and philosophically justiﬁ ed, rather than a looser linking principle that cannot be 
justiﬁ ed.
130 Cf. ibid. (“A continuous combat function may be openly expressed through the carrying of 
uniforms, distinctive signs, or certain weapons. Yet it may also be identiﬁ ed on the basis of con-
clusive behaviour, for example, where a person has repeatedly directly participated in hostilities in 
support of an organized armed group in circumstances indicating that such conduct constitutes a 
continuous function rather than a spontaneous, sporadic, or temporary role assumed for the dura-
tion of a particular operation.”)
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